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Abstract: This study documents a quantitative analysis of exchange rate volatilities and
misalignment in Uzbekistan for the period of 1994q3–2005q2. The results suggest that
the real exchange rate volatility and misalignment have depressing effects on the volume
of trade, mainly exports in Uzbekistan. The Governments currency rationing policy was
lessening the volatility proving that the policy-induced changes in exchange rate has a sta-
bilizing effect on trade flows. The implied elasticity for the most significant real exchange
rate volatility coefficient is -0.20. Using a two-step Engle-Granger technique import de-
mand and export supply price elasticities are computed. The results are consistent with
the predictions from a number of previous studies, and in particular, the estimated exports
price elasticity for Uzbek economy ranges from 1.65 to 1.84, while import demand price
elasticity is between -0.78 and -0.83. At the same time, relatively lower elasticity during
’the currency rationing’ period indicate that large devaluations, most likely, did not gen-
erate the expected improvements in the overall export performance.
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“I find it difficult to imagine a world in which it would not be important to
estimate exchange rate misalignments.” John Williamson
1 Introduction
The real exchange rate is one of the essential economic indicators of economy’s interna-
tional competitiveness, and therefore, has a strong influence on country’s foreign trade
developments. In particular, the impact of the real exchange rate developments on foreign
trade has been a topic of discussions in both developed and developing economies.
The relationship between exchange rate movements and trade flows has been studied
in a large number of theoretical and empirical papers. It is commonly accepted that the
movements of the real exchange rate have a permanent effect on exports and imports.
There are several studies that empirically tested this hypothesis using data mostly from
developed and developing countries.1 However, there are several studies that failed to find
evidence of an effect of the real effective exchange rate on trade flows.2.
In the light of recent developments in economic policy in Uzbekistan it becomes quite
important to examine the pros and cons of different exchange rate policy strategies. Par-
ticularly, in 1996, after low export revenues, the Government took measures to restrict
convertibility of the Soum (national currency – UZS) by reducing its quantity that could
be officially converted into foreign currency. Since that time there is existed a multiple
exchange rate regime in Uzbekistan, which included the official, the commercial bank and
parallel market exchange rates.
The Government adopted protectionist measures as part of the import-substitution
strategy. In this context, an overvalued official exchange rate has been used to tax exporting
sectors (cotton and gold production) in order to subsidize imports of capital and priority
consumer goods. As a result, the illegal curb market for foreign exchange rate gained in
importance. Staring from October 2003 Uzbekistan has fulfilled its currency convertibility
obligations to the IMF and joined the Article VIII of the IMF.
The above changes in economic policy and realities of the current transition period,
among other things, put the issue of formulation of an effective exchange rate policy on
the top of policy agenda and requires comprehensive analysis and modelling of exchange
1For instance, Mordecki (2000) concludes that during the period of 1990–1998 the Uruguayan external
sector was permanently affected by the changes in exchange rate.
2Rose (1991) and Lahreche-Revil and Benassy-Quere (2001) were not able to evidence an influence of
exchange rate uncertainty on trade in the G-7 countries and in China, respectively.
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rate behavior in new conditions. In particular, the movements of the real exchange rate
should be carefully analyzed and systematically monitored. In this regard, this paper
investigate the effect of exchange rate variability on the Uzbek imports from and exports
to other countries.3
It is often believed that the real exchange rate is overvalued in those economies where
restrictive foreign trade policy has been implemented. In this respect, this paper attempts
to measure the degree of a possible misalignment in the real exchange rate and to analyze
its impact on foreign trade flows in Uzbekistan.
Recent empirical studies suggest that the analysis of exchange rate misalignments plays
a key role in designing of policy strategies and may serve as a potential predictor of currency
crisis in emerging economies (Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998). Most studies find
evidence for strong negative effects on a country’s economic growth rate (for example,
Cottani, Cavallo, and Khan (1990), Ghura and Grennes (1993), Yotopoulos (1996)). At
the same time, there is a number of cross-country studies investigating the relationship
between distortion in real exchange rate and economic growth. They conclude that trade
liberalization and devaluation of the real exchange rate could improve export performance
and trigger export-led growth (Dollar (1992), Popov and Polterovich (2004)).
The results of this study would assist in assessment of the degree of impact of the
exchange rate and show up the possible developments in the case of different policy in-
struments (including devaluation of exchange rate, tariffs and import protectionism etc.)
which also will be useful in designing of export promotion policy.4
The estimation results would give an idea for policy makers about the level of the real
exchange misalignment and serve as a basis for policy-oriented recommendations related
to the modelling and choice of the appropriate the real exchange misalignment. For in-
stance, foreign trade liberalization and greater exchange rate flexibility could increase of
both trade flows and exchange rate volatility. Therefore, appropriate estimations, and con-
sequently policies are needed to avoid the underlying causes of unpredictable and damaging
movements in exchange rates.
In addition, to our knowledge there is no study on the subject of this paper that docu-
mented the impact of real exchange rate variabilities on foreign trade flows in Uzbekistan
using econometric techniques. Therefore, in this paper we have used a comprehensive ap-
3Despite ongoing developments, some recent studies characterize Uzbekistan as a slow reformer, lagging
behind in trade and foreign exchange liberalization. E.g. the EBRD Transition Report 2006 and the World
Banks Doing Business 2007 survey are among others.
4The results reported in this paper have been generated using Stata, Ox (available free for research
purposes) and R codes (open source).
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proach to both methodology and interpretation of obtained results in terms of bringing up
details.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 begins with review of the exchange policy
episodes for the period of 1993–2005 in Uzbekistan. Section 3 briefly reviews the relevant
(selected) literature on empirical evidence of exchange rate volatility and misalignments in
both developed and developing countries. In addition, various estimates of exchange rate
volatility and misalignment measures for Uzbekistan are reported. Then, Section 4 lays out
the theoretical framework. Following the existing literature briefly discussed in Section 3 we
estimate several proxies of real exchange rate volatility and misalignment for Uzbekistan.
Section 5 contains the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 presents conclusions.
2 Exchange rate policy in Uzbekistan: a brief overview
In Uzbekistan the exchange rate policy can be divided into three periods: the period be-
tween 1993 to 1996, late 1996 to 2000, and the post 2000 period. The first period starts
when in November 1993 the Government of Uzbekistan introduced a temporary (interme-
diate) currency “soum-coupon” at the rate of 1:1 to the Russian rouble. In 1993–1994,
the Government took several important measures to develop foreign exchange rate market
in the country. In July 1994 a full-value national currency “soum” has been introduced
at the rate of 1:1000 to the soum-coupon and 7:1 to the U.S. dollars. Next three months
exchange rate of UZS stabilized at level of 11–12 UZS/USD.
During the second period, to protect the domestic producers from foreign competition
a strategy of import substitution was implemented. In late 1996, after low export revenues,
the Government took measures to restrict convertibility of UZS by reducing its quantity
that could be officially converted into foreign currency (currency rationing policy). Since
that time there is existed a multiple exchange rate regime, which included the official
(traded through the Republican Currency Exchange – RCE), the commercial bank (traded
through the over-the-counter – OTC – currency market) and parallel market (curb) ex-
change rates. The Government regularly intervened in the official and commercial markets
by controlling the supply and demand for foreign exchange.
An overvalued official exchange rate has been used to tax exporting sectors (cotton
and gold production) in order to subsidize imports of capital and priority consumer goods.
As a result, the illegal curb market for foreign exchange rate gained in importance (IMF
2000). The official rate is used for surrendering the proceeds from centralized exports,
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Figure 1: The RER Dynamics and Policy Episodes in Uzbekistan, 1994–2005
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imports of certain capital goods and consumer goods, government purchases, and servicing
of government and government-guaranteed debt.
As a result of absence of free foreign exchange market and of coordination between
exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies, the spread between official rate and parallel
market rate is gradually increased, and for instance, had widened up to 440% (!) by the
second quarter of 2000. Besides, the restrictive foreign exchange and trade regime has led
to both import and export declines since 1996 (Figure 2-a). Indeed, large fall in exports
prices, mainly world cotton and gold prices, also had a negative impact on export earnings
(Figure 2-b). The currency rationing policy had also other negative consequences such as
strong distortions of the relative prices; restraint of inflow of direct foreign investments;
subsidizing of importers due to exporters; monopolization of the market; and absence of
macroeconomic stability.
The third period starts in 2000, when the Government announced gradual liberalization
of the foreign exchange and trade regimes. The policy targets were straightforward: reduce
the spread between the official and parallel market exchange rates, establishing a realistic
and single market rate, liberalizing both access and sale of foreign exchange and promote
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Figure 2: The Real Exchange Rate, Trade Flows, and the Terms of Trade, 1994–2005.
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exports. Particularly, the official rate is allowed to depreciate (against the U.S. dollar) by
more than 60% in the first half of 2000, and the spread between the official and parallel
market rates has been reduced to about 2.5 times compared to about 3.5 times during
certain periods of 1999.
For the purpose of expansion of the over-the-counter exchange market all currency
operations, but external debt servicing, have been transferred to the OTC market. As a
result of the undertaken measures in May 2000 the RCE (official) and OTC exchange rates
were unified. In November 2001, the Central Bank’s official exchange rate devalued by
about 60% against the dollar, and it was unified with the OTC rate (Figure 1). At the end
of 2001, the U.S. dollar was trading at 1497 UZS on the parallel market compared with
the official rate of 693 UZS. During 2002 the official exchange rate was devalued in steps
by about 30% against the U.S. dollar. At the same time, the parallel market exchange rate
appreciated by 12% by year-end; however, the government failed to achieve the 20% target
and the spread was equal to 38%.
Taken measures have allowed to unify official and the parallel market exchange rates.
Staring from 15 October 2003 Uzbekistan has fulfilled its currency-convertibility obligations
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to the IMF and joined the Article VIII of the IMF. Refusal from currency rationing and
achievement of convertibility of national currency have considerably strengthened an export
orientation of economic policy, as became one of the major factors of growth of foreign
trade.
3 Related literature
3.1 Exchange rate and trade flows
It is commonly accepted that the movements of the real exchange rate have a permanent
effect on exports and imports.5 There are several studies that empirically tested this
hypothesis using data mostly from developed and developing countries. For instance,
Mordecki (2000) concludes that during the period of 1990-1998 the Uruguayan external
sector was permanently affected by the changes in exchange rate.
Several studies examined the role of exchange rate policies in export promoting and the
effects of exchange rate volatility on exports. McKenzie (1999) provides a comprehensive
survey of the existing literature and concludes that the results depends on the estimation
technique of volatility. Moreover, most authors argue that short-run volatility has a tran-
sitory effect, and that long-run volatility has more impact on trade flows (Sapir, Sekkat,
and Weber (1994), Sekkat (1998), Rose (2000) among others).
Another interesting study documented strong evidence that Sri Lanka’s exports to the
developed countries under investigation were adversely affected by the increased volatility
in bilateral real exchange rates during 1978–96 (Weliwita, Ekanayake, and Tsujii 1999).
Sekkat and Vaoudakis (1999) made similar conclusion when they analyzed the impact of
exchange rate policies on export performance in four North African countries.6 They also
found negative impact of the exchange rate volatility on trade flows.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) provides additional evidence that there is a negative
long-run association between the trade balance and the real exchange rate, and the relative
price of non-tradables is an important channel linking the trade balance and the real
exchange rate. Using monthly data Pickard (2003) examines trade flows of certain steel
products between Canada, Mexico and the United States. The main conclusion of this
5However, Rose (1991) failed to find evidence of an effect of the real effective exchange rate on trade
flows for the G-7 countries. Lahreche-Revil and Benassy-Quere (2001) were also unable to evidence an
influence of exchange-rate uncertainty on trade in China.
6They considered Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia and the period of 1970–92.
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study is that the effects of exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade flows for steel products
sector are relatively small, but may differ depending on the presence of a well-developed
forward market.
Frankel and Wei (1993) and Devlin et al. (2001) also observed similar negative effects in
Asian countries and a set of 136 countries, respectively. Wang and Barrett (2002) employ
sectoral level, monthly data and a multivariate GARCH-M estimator and find that real
exchange rate risk has insignificant effects in most sectors, although agricultural trade
volumes appear highly responsive to real exchange rate volatility.
Feenstra and Kendall (1991), Caporale and Doroodian (1994) and Lee (1999) also em-
ployed a GARCH-type mechanism to estimate the volatility and found negative relation-
ship. Meanwhile, Kroner and Lastrapes (1993) using the similar methodology obtained
mixed results with varied signs and magnitudes. Summarizing, most of studies present
strong evidence that greater uncertainty in exchange rates (high volatility) reduces the
foreign trade flows (imports and exports) of a country.
3.2 Volatility, misalignment and trade flows
This section briefly reviews the selected literature on empirical evidence of exchange rate
volatility and misalignments in both developed and developing countries.
Sauer and Bohara (2001) used a large panel of 22 industrialized and 69 developing
countries to investigate the link between exchange rate volatility and exports. They em-
ployed three alternative proxies of real exchange rate volatility: the conditional variance
of a first-order ARCH model; the moving standard error of the estimate from a first-order
AR process; and the moving standard error of the estimate from a trend model.
Table 1 reports the sample means and standard errors. The results show that for each
volatility measure, the developing countries exhibit much higher real exchange rate uncer-
tainty than the industrialized countries. Besides, the Latin American and African countries
have the highest volatility whereas the Asian economies have the lowest uncertainty among
developing countries.
Based on a sample of 79 countries over the 1974–2003 period Calderon (2004) con-
structed the volatility of real effective exchange rate fluctuations as the standard deviation
of changes in the real effective exchange rate over a 5-year window. His results also confirm
that real exchange rate fluctuations in developing countries are four times as volatile as in
industrial economies.
Another interesting finding is that the more flexible is the exchange rate regime, the
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Table 1: Real Exchange Rate Volatility: Sample Means
Developed Developing Latin Africa Asia Uzbekistan
countries countries America
ARCH-baseda 0.003 0.004 0.067 0.048 0.010 0.069
AR-baseda 0.003 0.017 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.005
Standard deviationb 0.037 0.085 - - - 0.094
Notes: ARCH-based volatility is the conditional variance of GARCH-M(2,2) (1973–93). AR-based
volatility is the moving standard error of the estimate from AR(1) process (1973–93). Standard deviation
is a three year volatility is measured as standard deviation of the growth rate of the real exchange rate
(1990–2000). All variables are in logs. Sources: a Sauer and Bohara (2001); b Hausmann, Panizza, and
Rigobon (2004). For the Uzbek case authors’ calculations (1994q3–2005q4).
more volatile are the real exchange rate fluctuations. Among industrial countries, real
exchange rates among countries with flexible regimes are twice as volatile than among
countries with either hard pegs or fixed regimes. On the other hand, real exchange rates
among developing countries with flexible regimes are more than three times as volatile as
those in developing countries with either hard pegs or fixed regimes.
Hausmann, Panizza, and Rigobon (2004) documents large cross-country differences
(74 industrial and developing countries; 1980–2000) in the long run volatility of the real
exchange rate. They employed the standard deviation of the growth rate of the real
exchange rate as a measure of volatility. The results imply that the real exchange rate
of developing countries is approximately three times more volatile than the real exchange
rate in industrial countries.
Ofair and Collins (1997) constructed annual misalignment indicators for 93 countries
(developed – 23 and developing – 73), over 16 to 18 year periods since 1975. They provide
evidence that the real exchange rates were overvalued in most of the developing countries
during 1975–83, with the misalignments most pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia and especially Europe and Central Asia. In contrast, the real exchange rates were
relatively undervalued in all regions on average in the later period (1984–92).7
Lahreche-Revil and Benassy-Quere (2001) emphasized that a domino-style scenario of
devaluations and depreciations in East Asia would reduce the share of this region in world
7Indeed, such broad regional and time averages can mask significant differences among individual
countries.
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trade through lower GDPs in dollars, although the domestic value of international trade
would be raised.
Nabli and Veganzones-Varoudakis (2002) showed that the Middle East and North
African (MENA)8 countries were characterized by a significant overvaluation of their cur-
rency during the period of 1970-90, and that this overvaluation has had a cost for the
region in terms of competitiveness. They suggest that such significant overvaluation could
be result of the countries delay in adopting more flexible exchange rates and in reforming
their economies.
Frait, Komarek, and Melecky (2005) analyzed the misalignment of the real exchange
rate in five new European Union member states (namely, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
Slovakia, Slovenia) with the use of various approaches. In addition to the behavioral model,
they utilized the pure statistical techniques like the Hodrick-Prescott and Band-Pass filters.
The main finding of the the paper is that the real convergence of these countries has been
accompanied by sustained appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Taking into consideration the above discussions the main hypothesis of this study is
formulated as follows: exchange rate volatility and misalignments have depressing effects
on the volume of trade. We also consider what was causing the shocks to real exchange rate
– terms of trade shocks, changes in private capital flows, changes in government borrowing,
changes in foreign exchange reserves?
For this purposes we separate two different types of changes in real exchange rate: (1)
in response to changes in terms of trade and to private capital flows; (2) policy-induced
changes in real exchange rate (i.e. that occur only due to government/central bank policies
without any changes in terms of trade and private capital flows). The second hypothesis
then would be that the latter type of the changes in real exchange rate could have a
stabilizing effect on trade flows, whereas the former type of changes of real exchange rate
are increasing the volatility of trade.
4 Exchange rate volatility and misalignment
4.1 Measuring the real exchange rate volatility
Following the existing literature briefly discussed in Section 3 we estimate several proxies
of real exchange rate (RER) volatility for Uzbekistan. The first volatility measure (δ1),
8For comparison purposes, in addition to 11 MENA countries they considered 19 African (8 CFA and 11
non-CFA), 13 Latin America and 10 Asian countries. CFA is for “Communaute Francophone dAfrique”.
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Table 2: RER Volatility Measures: Summary Statistics
Mean SD SW Q Q2 SKE KUR
δ1 - S.D. 0.094 0.068 0.825*** 72.7*** 46.2*** 1.5 5.5
δ2 - GARCH-M(2,2) 0.069 0.057 0.91*** 174.6*** 80.1*** 1.1 4.4
δ3 - ARCH(1) 0.311 0.386 0.80*** 207.0*** 124.5*** 1.2 3.6
Note: SD – standard deviation. Q and Q2 Ljung-Box test. SW – the Shapiro-Wilk normality test. SKE
– skewness. KUR – kurtosis. Significant at the ***1% (**5%) level. Source: Authors’ calculations.
the most traditional one, investigated is the standard deviation of the growth rates of real
exchange rates computed as follows:
δ1,t+m = [
m∑
i−1
(rert+i−1 − rert+i−2)2/m]1/2.
where m is the order of the moving average, and rert is a ratio of the U.S. consumer price
index (p∗t ) to the domestic consumer price index (pt), multiplied by the quarterly nominal
exchange rate (et), expressed as the number of national currency units per foreign currency
unit or in logarithms rert = log(et) + log(p
∗
t )− log(pt). An appreciation is recorded as an
increase in the exchange rate index.
Next we compute other two alternative proxies of RER volatility: the conditional
variance of a GARCH-M(2,2) model (δ2) and the conditional variance of a first-order
ARCH model (δ3). Measuring of volatility using the ARCH-based models allows to cap-
ture “volatility clustering”, observed in the real exchange rate’s behavior. The idea is that
large fluctuations of the real exchange rate in the past tend to generate higher expected
volatility in the following periods.
In order to calculate an ARCH-based volatility, we employ a first-order ARCH, which
takes the form:
rert = α0 + α1rert−1 + ut
ut ∼ N(0, δ2,t)
δ2,t = β0 + β1u
2
t−1.
Table 2 reports summary statistics, including the mean, standard deviation, skewness
12
Figure 3: The RER Volatility Measures: Standard Deviation, ACRH and GARCH.
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(a) SD-based
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(b) GARCH-based
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(c) ARCH-based
Notes: Time interval between dashed vertical lines denotes the Government’s currency rationing policy
period: 1996q4 – 2003q4. Source: Authors’ calculations.
and kurtosis coefficients for the above discussed various estimates of exchange rate volatility
measures for Uzbekistan. In addition, the table includes the the Shapiro-Wilk normality
test and the Ljung-Box serial correlation test statistics for both volatility measures (Q)
and squared volatility measures (Q2) with 20 lags.
The Shapiro-Wilk normality test and high kurtosis coefficients show the non-normality
of all of these time series. Ljung-Box statistics for volatility measures indicates no autocor-
relation for all estimates. At the same time, the Ljung-Box Q2 statistics is also significant
for all series and suggests an ARCH process for the conditional variance. Figure 3 depicts
dynamics of all three proxies of the RER volatility computed based on the above discussed
techniques.
4.2 Measuring misalignment with a single-equation approach
We follow Edwards (1989) in using the term “misalignment” to denote the gap between the
real exchange rate and the equilibrium exchange rate, which is not observable. However,
the theory tells us that it is a function of observable macroeconomic variables, and that
the actual real exchange rate approaches its equilibrium level over time (Edwards (1989),
Montiel (1997)). Based on this logic, we outline an econometric methodology for estimating
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the equilibrium real exchange rate and estimate using the Uzbek quarterly data.
Let’s define the equilibrium real exchange rate (rer∗t ) as the steady-state real exchange
rate conditional on a vector of permanent values for the fundamentals i.e.
rer∗t = β
′Ft (1)
where Ft – the vector of permanent values for the fundamentals and β – long run parameters
(coefficients) of interest. As discussed earlier, rer∗t is not observable, and therefore, to
estimate β we need an empirical model that is consistent with the above equation but
relates observable variables. Following Baffes, Elbadawi, and O’Connell (2001) Equation
1 comes from a steady state relationship between actual values of the real exchange rate
(rert) and fundamentals (Ft). This relationship can be analytically expressed as following:
rert = β
′Ft + ωt (2)
where ωt is a is a mean-zero, stationary random variable. The below specified general
error-correction model is consistent with both equations 1 and 2, and embodies the central
insight of the single-equation approach: that the equilibrium real exchange rate can be
identified econometrically as that unobserved function of the fundamentals towards which
the actual real exchange rate gravitates over time:9
∆rert = α(rert−1 − β′Ft−1) +
p∑
j=1
µj∆rert−j +
p∑
j=0
γ′j∆Ft−j + vt. (3)
The equilibrium exchange rate is then the predicted value from this equation based on
a given vector of macroeconomic fundamentals (Ft). The following proposed fundamentals
have been extensively used by empirical studies on the real exchange rate determinants,
for example, Begg, Halpern, and Wyplosz (1999), Csajbok (2003) and Kim and Korhonen
(2002) are among others:10
• tot = terms of trade. Proxied by cotton and gold prices and equal to 0.75 ∗Cotton+
0.25 ∗ Gold. Uzbekistan is a small economy, and therefore price taker in terms of
both exports and imports.
• open = exports + imports over GDP. This is an openness indicator that is a proxy
9See Baffes, Elbadawi, and O’Connell (2001) for a discussion of the single equation approach.
10See Frait, Komarek, and Melecky (2005) and Egert (2003) for detailed survey.
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for trade restrictions and/or controls. Certainly, more liberal the trade regime the
more total amount of foreign trade. However, its impact on real exchange rate
depends on the nature (“direction”) of this increase, and therefore the expected sign
is ambiguous. For instance, if the current account worsened, then the real exchange
rate would be depreciated.
• gcons = share of government consumption in GDP. This is a proxy for government
demand for nontradables.In the case of increase in government consumption will
result in appreciation of the real exchange rate.
• ishare = share of investment in GDP. The expected sign is ambiguous. Because it
heavily depends on the relative factor intensities between sectors of economy.
• gdp = per capita GDP. It is proxy for domestic productivity.
• d96 = a policy change dummy variable that takes the value of one for the period of
1996q3–2003q4 and zero otherwise. Since the Governments currency rationing policy
has been directed to tax exporting sectors (mainly, cotton and gold production) in
order to subsidize imports of capital and priority consumer goods, this shock should
appreciate the real exchange rate.
The estimation strategy consists of three steps. First step involves estimating the long-
run parameters. We employ the Johansen-Juselius cointegration test in order to investigate
the existence of a long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and the selected
explanatory variables (determining the order of integration). Another econometric issue
we attend is nonstationarity of variables. In this case standard regression techniques such
as the Ordinary Least Squares are not useful and could lead to “spurious” results. For that
reason, we also report the results of nonstationarity tests i.e. the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
and the Philip-Perron unit roots tests.
In the second step, the proposed fundamentals are decomposed into permanent and
transitory components. Then the transitory effects are set to zero and actual values of the
fundamentals are inserted into the estimated equation. In the final step the real exchange
rate misalignments will be estimated as the residuals of Equation 3.
Table 3 shows the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit-root
tests for all variables. Both tests indicate that the real exchange rate and terms of trade
are seemingly nonstationarity variables. At the same time, all other variables appear to be
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Table 3: Stationarity Statistics: Unit Root Tests
Without TT With TT Without TT With TT
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP
rert -1.11 -1.38 -1.87 -1.90 ∆rer -4.91 -4.97 -5.31 -5.35
tott -1.38 -1.56 -1.28 -1.60 ∆tott -4.59 -4.49 -4.57 -4.45
opent -1.76 -2.38 -3.15 -2.84 ∆opent -8.60 -11.11 -8.80 -10.42
gconst -2.28 -2.98 -3.61 -3.51 ∆gconst -7.44 -8.59 -7.52 -9.14
isharet -2.57 -2.06 -5.73 -5.73 ∆isharet -7.72 -14.30 -7.62 -14.05
gdpct -2.18 -3.82 -4.61 -4.69 ∆gdpct -7.35 -11.76 -7.40 -15.71
Notes: TT – time trend. ADF and PP refer to augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for a
unit root, respectively. The number of observations is 44. Source: Authors’ calculations.
trend-stationary. The unit root test results also confirm that all variables are stationary
in first difference i.e. I(1).
It means that we could employ simple first differencing technique to remove the non-
stationarity problem. However, this could result in discarding useful information about
relationship among the variables of interest, for example, in our case the relationship be-
tween the real exchange rate and its fundamentals.
Therefore we first test for the presence of cointegration between rert and Ft. Table
4 reports the estimated cointegrating relationships, and also shows the presence of I(1)
cointegrating vectors. Using the λ-max statistic (column 2), we test the null hypothesis
that r = 0 against the alternative that r ≤ 1. Our test statistic of 113.44 exceeds the
critical value of 45.28 which leads to the rejection of the hypothesis of no cointegrating
relationship. The trace statistic of 176.86 also exceeds its corresponding critical value of
124.40 which is consistent with the result using the λ-max statistic.
Next we test the null hypothesis of at most one cointegration vector (r = 1). In this
case, however, the λ-max statistic of 28.30 is smaller than the critical value of 39.37 and we
cannot reject the null hypothesis. The trace test leads to the same conclusion. Therefore,
regardless of which statistic is used, we cannot reject the hypothesis that we have one
cointegrating vector.
We now move on estimating the long-run parameters using the nonstationary panel
techniques, in particular, the Engle-Granger two-step method (based on Equation 3). Ta-
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Table 4: Results of Cointegration Analysis
5 percent critical values 10 percent critical values
λ-max trace λ-max trace λ-max trace
With the policy change dummy variable
r = 0 113.44 176.86 45.28 124.40 42.32 118.50
r ≤ 1 28.30 63.41 39.37 94.15 36.76 89.48
Without the policy change dummy variable
r = 0 103.54 154.78 39.37 94.15 36.76 89.48
r ≤ 1 13.28 21.67 33.46 68.52 30.90 64.84
Note: The first row (r = 0) tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration; the second (r = 1) tests the null
hypothesis of at most one cointegration vector, etc. λmax – the estimated Johansen-Juselius likelihood
value. trace – trace statistics. The Osterwald-Lenum critical values (95% and 90% confidence intervals).
Sample size – 44, 1994q3:2005q2. Source: Authors’ calculations.
ble 5 contains long-run parameter estimation results for Uzbekistan obtained from the
Engle-Granger method, including and excluding the 1996 policy change dummy vari-
able. Unit root tests applied to the estimated residuals obtained from the first step of
the Engle-Granger method indicate that there is strong evidence of cointegration in both
cases (with/without the policy change dummy variable).
In general the estimated long run parameters are consistent with the predictions from
theory. In particular, the government consumption (gcons) has an appreciating impact
on the real exchange rate. The effect is particularly strong and significant in the model
estimated including the policy change dummy variable (d96) from the single-equation,
suggesting that most government spending is directed toward nontradables.
Investment (ishare) has a negative effect on the real exchange rate, suggesting that an
increasing share of investment in GDP shifts spending toward tradable goods in the long
term. This shift, other things equal, would depreciate the real exchange rate. The implied
elasticity suggests that a 10% increase in the investment share in GDP depreciates the real
exchange rate by at least 1.4% (2.0% in the second model).11
The estimated openness coefficient (open) is positive and significant in both models,
suggesting that trade liberalization policy would appreciate the long-run equilibrium real
11According to Edwards (1989) this indicator is equal to 7% for s group of 12 developing countries.
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Table 5: Long Run Parameter Estimates: Two-Step Engle-Granger Method
The First Step The Second Step
with d96 without d96 with d96 without d96
Constant -1.01 2.58 Constant -0.11 2.56**
(-0.59) (1.31) (-0.16) (2.37)
Adjustment speed:
ut−1 -0.12 -0.08
(-0.97) (-0.70)
Parameters:
tott 0.08 -0.65* tott−1 -0.13 -0.69***
(0.24) (-1.76) (-0.57) (-3.40)
gdpct 0.21 -0.05 gdpct−1 0.20* -0.01
(1.25) (-0.21) (1.76) (-0.06)
opent 0.27* 0.33* opent−1 0.34*** 0.39***
(1.94) (1.89) (3.67) (3.03 )
gconst 0.13 0.50*** gconst−1 0.18*** 0.48***
(1.13) (2.78) (3.25) (4.59)
isharet -0.12** -0.20*** isharet−1 -0.14*** -0.20***
(-2.43) (-3.16) (-7.99) (-5.52)
d96t 0.48*** – d96t−1 0.38*** –
(-4.98) – (5.83) –
R2 0.68 0.52 R2 0.91 0.76
DW 0.88 0.92 DW 1.84 1.35
ADF -3.49 -3.70 ADF -6.19 -4.83
PP -3.55 -3.64 PP -6.20 -4.76
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. DW – the Durbin-Watson statistic. ADF – the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test. PP – the Phillips-Perron test. Significant at the ***1% ,**5% and *10%
level. The dependent variable is ∆rert. ut−1 – error term. Source: Authors’ calculations.
exchange rate. The terms of trade (tot) in both cases has a negative and significant (only in
the model corrected for d96) impact on the real exchange rate. The positive coefficient on
d96 dummy variable is consistent, and confirms that the Government’s currency rationing
policy substantially appreciated the real exchange rate.
Now, we can estimate the degree of misalignment, ma1,t, which is simply the percentage
difference between the real and equilibrium exchange rates:
ma1t = (
rert
rer∗t
− 1) · 100. (4)
Table 6 show alternative measures of the equilibrium real exchange rate and the esti-
mated level of the real exchange rate misalignment. The equilibrium exchange rate has
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Table 6: Observed, Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate and Misalignment
1996q1:96q4 1999q4:2000q4 2003q1:03q4 2004q1:05q2
Observed rert 154 184 103 100
Equilibrium rer∗t 126 147 94 104
misalignment I ma1t 10.1 25.6 6.6 -5.5
misalignment II ma2t 11.4 24.7 -1.3 -0.3
Notes: The observed RER (rert) is the official real exchange rate. ma1t = 100 ∗ (rert − rer∗t )/rer∗t .
been calculated based on the long-run parameter vectors, taken from the Engle-Granger
regression in column 5 of Table 5. Equilibrium values are obtained directly from that
regression. Figure 4 depicts the observed and equilibrium real exchange rates.
Figure 4-b shows that misalignment patterns are consistent with different policy periods
discussed in Section ??. The estimation results for 1994q3-1995q4 and 1996q1-1996q4
periods do not indicate any major overvaluation, and the real exchange rate was on average
undervalued by 10%.
During the Government’s currency rationing policy period (late 1996–2000), the above
diagram reveals a substantial overvaluation (9% period average) and a widening gap be-
tween the actual and the estimated equilibrium real exchange rates. The period from
1999q4 to 2000q4 was , when the estimated overvaluation reached up to 38% in the first
quarter of 2000 (25% period average).
The Government managed to reverse substantial real overvaluation by the end of 2002.
After several devaluations the real exchange rate was very close to the estimated equilibrium
level. In particular, in the fourth quarter of 2002 the real exchange rate was undervalued
only by 1%. The average undervaluation of the real exchange rate during the post 2002-year
period was equal to 1%.
In addition to the estimated degree of misalignment ma1t from Equation 4, we use
another alternative measure of misalignment. This approach is based on using use the
index of country’s relative price level (RPL), suggested by Dollar (1992), where RPLt =
100 ·rert ·P/P ∗. In other words, he used the RPL index as a measure for the real exchange
rate.
To estimate the relationship between national price level and endowments, Dollar (1992)
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Figure 4: Misalignment, Observed and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates
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Notes: An upward movement is an appreciation of the RER. ma1t = 100 ∗ (rert − rer∗t )/rer∗t .
used different model specifications of the following regression: RPLt = α0 + α1GDPt +
α3DENSt + dt, where GDPt – per capita GDP; DENSt – population density; and dt –
year dummies. We also constructed the similar equation using the Uzbek data for the
period of 1996q3–2005q2. Hence the real exchange rate misalignment (ma2t) is estimated
as the residuals from the the following regression:12
RPLt = α0 + α1GDPt + α2GDP
2
t + α3d96 + qk + trendt + ut.
12The regression number 6 in Dollar (1992), Table 2, p. 528.
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Figure 5: Exchange Rate Volatility vs. Currency Rationing Policy
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4.3 Exchange rate volatility and currency rationing policy
As discussed earlier, it is an important issue to analyze the nature of shocks causing to
real exchange rate as well as implications of the governments currency rationing policy for
dynamics of the real exchange rate.
For this purpose, we predict the real exchange rate at the second stage (after the
cointegration analysis) using the Equation 3 and assuming the inflows of private capital
and cotton prices are constant. Comparing the fluctuations of this predicted real exchange
rate with the fluctuations of the actual real exchange rate would allow us to estimate to
what extent government policy in particular periods was mitigating the volatility or, on
the contrary, increasing this volatility.
We plotted actual and predicted exchange rate volatilities in Figure 5. During the
period of 1996-2002 the Governments currency rationing policy was lessening the volatility.
On the contrary, gradual liberalization of the foreign exchange and trade regimes, aimed at
establishing a realistic and single market rate, led to substantial increase of this volatility
(the post 2002 period).
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5 Exchange rate and trade flows: key findings
In this section, we investigate to which extent, empirically, the real exchange affects foreign
trade flows in Uzbekistan. In general, there is, so called, “pessimism” concerning the impact
of changes in exchange rates on trade flows in developing countries. Some studies argue
that due to low import and export elasticities the required changes in the real exchange
rate are not able to improve the trade balance, and therefore, exchange rate adjustment
policies are not effective in dealing with balance-of-payments deficits.
Ghei and Pritchett (2001) examines three types of the above-mentioned pessimisms
regarding the elasticity of import demand and export supply as well as the elasticity of
demand for the country’s exports in world markets. They find that none of the three
pessimisms is justified for developing countries. Reviewing the existing empirical literature,
Ghei and Pritchett (2001) conclude that a reasonable range for the aggregate price elasticity
of demand for imports is -0.7 to -0.9, and that elasticities of export supply tend to be in
the range of 1.0 to 2.0.
Nevertheless, in most of developing (transition) countries, in particular in Uzbekistan,
exchange rate adjustment policy is considered as an essential element of trade policy.
Therefore, reasonably accurate and precise estimates of import and export price elasticities
can be used by policy advisors and practitioners in applied economic policy analysis, and
in designing of development strategies. Following this logic, below we have tried to shed
light into possible effects of the real exchange rate movements on export and import flows
in Uzbekistan.
In order to analyze the effects of the real exchange rate volatility and misalignments on
imports and exports, consistent with the existing studies, we estimate the long-run export
and import equations. In particular, the following typical log-linear specifications will be
separately estimated using a two-step Engle-Granger estimation method:
rm = f(rgd, rer, δi, d96) (5)
rx = g(rgd, rer, δi, d96) (6)
where rm and rx are real aggregate imports and real exports, respectively; rgd is domestic
real GDP; rer is the real exchange rate to proxy the relative price competitiveness of
commodities between countries; δi, i = 1, 2, 3 – the estimated measures of the real exchange
rate volatility; and d96 – the 1996 policy dummy.
All variables are in logs with the exception of the volatility measures. A constant, a
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Table 7: Results of Cointegration and Unit Root Tests
H0 λ-max trace λˆ ˆtrace
Import equation
r = 0 43.82 68.76 33.46 68.52
r ≤ 1 15.50 24.94 27.07 47.21
Export equation
r = 0 45.67 70.43 33.46 68.52
r ≤ 1 17.94 24.76 27.07 47.21
Var ADF PP Var ADF PP
rmt -2.12 -2.74 ∆rmt -8.36 -9.00
rxt -4.82 -4.78 ∆rxt -12.1 -14.3
rert -1.12 -1.35 ∆rert -5.04 -5.10
rgdt -2.34 -3.95 ∆rgdt -7.07 -8.99
δ1 -2.33 -2.34 ∆δ1 -6.54 -6.62
δ2 -1.69 -1.56 ∆δ2 -6.10 -6.20
δ3 -1.24 -1.66 ∆δ3 -4.90 -4.95
Note: 1) Cointegration test. The first row (r = 0) tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration; the
second (r = 1) tests the null hypothesis of at most one cointegration vector, etc. λ-max – the estimated
Johansen-Juselius likelihood value. λˆ and ˆtrace – the Osterwald-Lenum critical values (95% interval).
Sample size – 44 quarterly observations, 1994q3:2005q2. 2) Unit roots tests. ADF and PP refer to
augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for a unit root, respectively. T = 44.
trend and a set of seasonal (quarterly) dummies are included in all regressions. Regard-
ing the expected coefficients’signs, theory predicts that the real exchange rate volatility
increases uncertainty and therefore could hinder the foreign trade flows.
From this point we use the “appreciation is down” convention of measuring the real
exchange rate in domestic-currency terms. In this case, for example, an increase in the
real exchange rate in domestic-currency terms is an depreciation.
In order to examine the stationarity of the data, we conducted two unit root tests: the
augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests. The test results reported in Table
7 indicate that all variables are integrated of order one i.e. I(1), but rxt appears to be I(0)
at the 1% level. Using the Johansen’s method we tested for the number of cointegrating
vectors in the system. The results, reported in Table 8, also confirm the presence of I(1).
5.1 The real exchange rate variability and import flows
In the presence of cointegrating vectors, it is advised to employ an error correction model
developed by Engle and Granger (1987) that was applied earlier in Section 4 for estimating
the long-run parameters of the real exchange rate. Table 8 shows the results for the import
demand regressions with different volatility and misalignment measures.
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Table 8: Import Demand Equations: Error Correction Model Results
dep.var: Volatility dep.var: Misalignment
rmt with δ1 with δ2 with δ3 rmt with mis1 with mis2
Constant 2.35*** 2.25*** 2.45*** Constant 2.35*** 2.39***
(8.77) (10.51) (11.09) (13.47) (15.53)
Adjustment Speed Adjustment Speed
rmt−1 or ut−1 -0.64** -0.87** -0.51** rmt−1 or ut−1 -0.67*** -0.58**
(-4.11) (-5.98) (-3.45) (-4.65) (-3.69)
rgdt 0.38** 0.40*** 0.38** rgdt 0.46** 0.53***
(3.02) (4.10) (3.00) (2.95) (4.65)
rert -0.78** -0.83** -0.40 misi,t -0.007** -0.003
(-2.79) (-3.04) (-1.19) (-2.65) (-1.54)
δi,t -0.15** -0.20*** -0.01 δ1 -1.10** -0.92*
(-2.33) (-5.72) (-0.32) (-2.11) (-1.86)
d96 -0.22** -0.01 -0.32** d96 -0.12 -0.15*
(-2.02) (-0.04) (-2.25) (-1.25) (-1.76)
trend -0.05** -0.05*** -0.04** trend -0.05** -0.06***
(-2.96) (-4.10) (-2.36) (-2.97) (-4.40)
R2 0.69 0.77 0.62 R2 0.70 0.68
DW 2.19 1.96 2.33 DW 2.25 2.28
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. DW – the Durbin-Watson statistic. Significant at
the ***1%, **5% and *10% level. The dependent variable is rmt. ut−1 – error term. Misalignment
indicator is converted to rdt which indicates the estimated depreciation or appreciation required to bring
the actual real exchange to the equilibrium level, and calculated as following: rdt = (rer∗t /rert − 1) · 100.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
As expected import demand price elasticities are negative in all three regressions, but
significant only the first two models with average -0.81. The results are consistent with
the predictions from a number of studies that estimate import price elasticities for both
developed and developing countries (see Table 9).
The real exchange rate volatility coefficients have the expected sign in all three equa-
tions13, but significant at reasonable statistical levels only in two regressions (with standard
deviation and GARCH-based volatility measures). The implied elasticity suggests that a
10% increase in the volatility would cause a decrease of imports by at least 1.5% – 2.0%.
Another important observation is the adjustment speed. The estimated adjustment
coefficient of the cointegrating vector is for all models ranges from -0.51 to -0.87 and
13Which is consistent with the existing empirical works. E.g. Weliwita, Ekanayake, and Tsujii (1999),
Sekkat and Vaoudakis (1999), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), Frankel and Wei (1993), Devlin et al. (2001)
24
Table 9: Comparative Table: Price Elasticity of Aggregate Import Demand
Countries Mean of averages Median of averages Estimated price
elasticity
Developed countries -0.93 -0.80 -0.64 : -1.51
Developing countries -0.79 -0.79 -0.51 : -1.07
African countries -1.14 -1.06 -0.88 : -1.40
Uzbekistan -0.81 -0.81 -0.78 : -0.83
Source: Adapted from Ghei and Pritchett (2001), pp.475–478. For the Uzbek case authors’ calculations.
significantly different from zero in all equations, suggesting a relatively quick adjustment
to the past disequilibrium in import trade volumes. Besides, it indicates that the error
correction mechanism is stable.
To analyze the impact of the real exchange rate misalignments on imports, the above
Equation 5 will be re-estimated substituting real exchange rate misalignments (mat) for
real exchange rate levels (rert) i.e. rm = f(rgd,maj, δi, d96, qk). The second part of
the Table 8 summarizes the error correction model estimation results for import demand
equations. All the explanatory variables in all model specifications carry the expected
signs.
Regarding the exchange rate misalignment, we obtained a significant results at the 5%
level when we used a single-equation based misalignment measure (ma1). The implied
elasticity shows that a 100% depreciation of the real exchange would lead to little impact
on imports, and could decrease it at least by 0.7%.
5.2 The real exchange rate variability and export flows
To analyze the effects of the real exchange rate volatility and misalignments on exports,
consistent with the existing studies, we run the long-run export supply regressions (Equa-
tion 6) with different measures of volatility and misalignment.
Table 10 summarizes the results for the quarterly real exports regressions. Overall the
results are in line with the theoretical prediction, and all expected signs are in correct
direction. As expected export supply price elasticities are positive and significantly dif-
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Table 10: Export Supply Equations: Error Correction Model Results
dep.var: Volatility dep.var: Misalignment
rxt with δ1 with δ2 with δ3 rxt with mis1 with mis2
Constant 2.00** 1.18 1.07 Constant 1.35** 2.04***
(2.44) (1.44) (1.32) (2.94) (5.64)
Adjustment Speed Adjustment Speed
rxt−1 or ut−1 -0.98*** -0.88*** -0.88*** rxt−1 or ut−1 -0.75*** -0.86***
(-5.55) (-5.48) (-4.93) (-4.13) (-6.03)
rgdt -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 rgdt -0.30 - 0.04
(-0.06) (-0.25) (-0.24) (-1.02) (-1.29)
rert 1.65** 1.84** 1.82** mai,t 0.006** 0.006**
(2.39) (2.22) (2.40) (2.06) (2.31)
δi,t -0.98 -0.07 -0.06 δi,t -0.53 -0.69
(-1.51) (-0.32) (-0.05) (-0.62) (-1.38)
d96 -0.13 0.03 0.03 d96 -0.05 -0.27***
(-0.66) (0.20) (0.22) (-0.31) (-3.25)
R2 0.74 0.70 0.70 R2 0.75 0.78
DW 2.10 2.04 2.04 DW 1.92 2.45
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. DW – the Durbin-Watson statistic. Significant at
the ***1%, **5% and *10% level. The dependent variable is ∆rert. ut−1 – error term. Misalignment
indicator is converted to rdt which indicates the estimated depreciation or appreciation required to bring
the actual real exchange to the equilibrium level, and calculated as following: rdt = (rer∗t /rert − 1) · 100.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
ferent from zero at the 5% level in all three regressions (with δ1, δ2 and δ3). Despite the
theoretically correct signs on the coefficients of other independent variables, such as the
domestic activity term (rgdt) and the exchange rate volatility (δt), they are not significant
in any of the three regressions for reasonable statistical levels of significance.
Similar to the above discussed import demand regressions’ case, the estimated adjust-
ment coefficient of the cointegrating vector is for all models ranges from -0.88 to -0.98 and
significantly different from zero in all equations, suggesting stability of the error correction
mechanism, and a relatively quick adjustment to the past disequilibrium in export trade
volumes.
Majority of empirical studies documented that, in developing countries a depreciation
of the real exchange rate leads to strong increased export supply. In contrast, an appreci-
ation of the real exchange rate could lead to a large deterioration in export performance
of economies. Reviewing the exiting literature, Ghei and Pritchett (2001) arrive at a con-
clusion that a reasonable range for the aggregate price elasticities of export supply tend
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Table 11: Comparative Table: Price Elasticity of Aggregate Export Supply
Countries Exports Period covered Price elasticity
Non-oil-exporting developing countries TME 1963:1981 2.01
Pooled SSA countries TME 1965:1982 1.01
7 developed countries TE – 1.10 : 6.60
Uzbekistan TE 1994q3:2005q2 1.65 : 1.84
Uzbekistan (currency rationing policy) TE 1996q3:2003q3 1.24 : 1.57
TE and TME are for total and total merchandize exports, respectively. SSA – Sub-Saharan African
countries. Source: Adapted from Ghei and Pritchett (2001), p.489. For the Uzbek case authors’
calculations.
to be in the range of 1.0 to 2.0 (see Table 11). In our case, the estimated price elasticity
for Uzbek economy ranges from 1.65 to 1.84 (with the period average of 1.77) implying a
considerable magnitude of the potential response of aggregate exports to the real exchange
variability.
We also computed ’indicative’ price elasticity range for the period of the Government’s
currency rationing policy (1.24 – 1.57 with the period average of 1.45). These relatively
lower elasticities indicate that due to Government’s restrictive export policy14 large de-
valuations, most likely, did not generate the expected improvements in the overall export
performance.
The possible impact of the real exchange rate misalignments on exports is analyzed
using modified specification of Equation 6. In particular, the real exchange rate misalign-
ments (mat) are substituted for real exchange rate levels (rert) i.e. rx = f(rgd,maj, δi, d96).
The second part of the Table 10 summarizes the error correction model estimation results
for import demand equations. All the explanatory variables in all model specifications
carry the expected signs. Regarding the real exchange rate misalignment impact, both
regressions generated almost similar estimates for elasticity coefficients. In particular, the
implied elasticity shows that a 100% depreciation of the real exchange would increase
exports only by 0.6%.
The estimated results also allow us to analyze possible implications of the Governments
14Recall the Government used an overvalued official exchange rate to tax exporting sectors (cotton and
gold production) in order to subsidize imports of capital and priority consumer goods.
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Figure 6: Uzbekistan: Actual vs. Predicted Trade Flows
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Note: ’Predicted values’ of imports and exports are calculated assuming that there is no currency
rationing policy, volatility and misalignment (dashed line). Source: Author’s calculations.
currency rationing policy for dynamics of import and export flows. For this purpose, we
predict the real imports using the first model specification with mis1, and assuming the
there is no currency rationing policy, volatility and misalignment. In similar manner, we
estimate the predicted real exports. During the period of 1996-2002 the Governments
currency rationing policy was lessening the volatility (Figure 6).
6 Conclusions
The present study attempted to produce a quantitative analysis of exchange rate volatilities
and misalignment in Uzbekistan for the period of 1994–2005. The econometric estimation
strategy consists of three main steps. First step involves computing several alternative
proxies of the real exchange volatility. Then in the second we estimate the equilibrium
exchange rate and misalignment using a two step Engle-Granger method. We followed
Edwards (1989) in using the term “misalignment” to denote the gap between the real
exchange rate and the equilibrium exchange rate. Finally, we investigate to which extent,
empirically, the real exchange affects foreign trade flows in Uzbekistan.
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The results of the analysis suggest that there is clear evidence of exchange rate move-
ments’ impact on foreign trade flows in Uzbekistan. Below, we have tried to group the
main conclusions drawn from the econometric analysis presented in this study.
1. The determinants of the long run real exchange rate in Uzbekistan. In general the
estimated long run parameters of the real exchange rate are consistent with the predic-
tions from theory. In particular, the government consumption has an appreciating impact
on the real exchange rate. The effect is particularly strong and significant in the model
estimated including the 1996 policy change dummy variable, suggesting that most gov-
ernment spending is directed toward nontradables. Besides, the positive coefficient on
this dummy variable is consistent, and confirms that the Government’s currency rationing
policy substantially appreciated the real exchange rate.
Investment has a negative effect on the real exchange rate, suggesting that an increasing
share of investment in GDP shifts spending toward tradable goods in the long term. This
shift, other things equal, would depreciate the real exchange rate. For example, the implied
elasticity suggests that a 10% increase in the investment share in GDP would depreciate
the real exchange rate by at least 1.4%-2.0%. The estimated openness coefficient is positive
and significant, suggesting that trade liberalization policy would appreciate the long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate in Uzbekistan. Seemingly, this is a theoretically ambitious
result, and needs for further research.
2. The real exchange rate misalignment. During the Government’s currency rationing
policy period (late 1996–2000), our analysis reveals a substantial overvaluation (9% period
average) and a widening gap between the actual and the estimated equilibrium real ex-
change rates. The period from 1999q4 to 2000q4 was , when the estimated overvaluation
reached up to 38% in the first quarter of 2000 (25% period average).
The Government managed to reverse substantial real overvaluation by the end of 2002.
After several devaluations the real exchange rate was very close to the estimated equilibrium
level. In particular, in the fourth quarter of 2002 the real exchange rate was undervalued
only by 1%. The average undervaluation of the real exchange rate during the post 2002-year
period was equal to 1%.
3. The real exchange rate volatility. The real exchange rate volatility is likely to be an
increasing concern for foreign trade policy in Uzbekistan. The implied elasticity suggests
that a 10% increase in the volatility would cause a decrease of imports by at least 1.5%
– 2.0%. At the same time the results indicate that the Governments currency rationing
policy was lessening the volatility proving that the policy-induced changes in exchange rate
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has a stabilizing effect on trade flows.
Comparing the fluctuations of the predicted real exchange rate with the fluctuations of
the actual real exchange rate allows us to estimate to what extent government policy in
particular periods was mitigating the volatility or, on the contrary, increasing this volatility.
During the period of 1996-2002 the Governments currency rationing policy was lessening
the volatility. On the contrary, gradual liberalization of the foreign exchange and trade
regimes, aimed at establishing a realistic and single market rate, led to substantial increase
of this volatility (the post 2002 period).
4. Exchange rate variability and trade flows. In most of developing (transition) coun-
tries, in particular in Uzbekistan, exchange rate adjustment policy is considered as an
essential element of trade policy. Therefore, reasonably accurate and precise estimates of
import and export price elasticities can be used by policy advisors and practitioners in
applied economic policy analysis, and in designing of development strategies. Following
this logic, below we have tried to shed light into possible effects of the real exchange rate
movements on export and import flows in Uzbekistan.
The exiting empirical literature concluded that a reasonable range for the aggregate
price elasticities of export supply tend to be in the range of 1.0 to 2.0. In our case, the
estimated price elasticity for Uzbek economy ranges from 1.65 to 1.84 (with the period
average of 1.77) implying a considerable magnitude of the potential response of aggregate
exports to the real exchange variability.
We also computed ’indicative’ price elasticity range for the period of the Government’s
currency rationing policy (1.24 – 1.57 with the period average of 1.45). These relatively
lower elasticities indicate that due to Government’s restrictive export policy large deval-
uations, most likely, did not generate the expected improvements in the overall export
performance.
We also provided an empirical evidence of negative impact of the Government’s 1996
measures on exports. As it was expected the 1996 policy change had a negative impact
on export volumes, and increased imports. The implied elasticity shows that a 100%
depreciation of the real exchange would lead to little impact on both imports and exports,
and would decrease (increase) imports (exports) only by 0.7% (0.6%).
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